Список проголосовавших за комментарий "Активный Инвестор, <br/> Вот, например, pdf сборник DUAL-CLASS SHARES REVISITED<br/> <br/> <a href="/r.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D%26cad%3Drja%26uact%3D8%26ved%3D2ahUKEwiI3t6h3IbsAhVso4sKHT-pDMQQFjADegQIAhAB%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Feng.sirfe.com%252Findex.php%253Fmodule%253Dfile%2526act%253DprocFileDownload%2526file_srl%253D31604%2526sid%253Dc6a7cca4040e73b7b0ddc7ab05a7ec9d%26usg%3DAOvVaw31RAH854kKJD9oonB5IwRo&s=3289458346">www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiI3t6h3IbsAhVso4sKHT-pDMQQFjADegQIAhAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Feng.sirfe.com%2Findex.php%3Fmodule%3Dfile%26act%3DprocFileDownload%26file_srl%3D31604%26sid%3Dc6a7cca4040e73b7b0ddc7ab05a7ec9d&usg=AOvVaw31RAH854kKJD9oonB5IwRo</a><br/> <br/> Кратко говорится об истории вопроса (на NYSE это, оказывается, даже в 1984 году появилось и было несколько не IT_компаний, которые этим воспользовались). Но особо рассматривается такая структура class A-class B именно для IT компаний, началось на NASDAQ все с Гугл, там целая глава об этом, о том, что критику вызвало, как объясняли и т.д.<br/> <blockquote>It enabled the co-founders to make business decisions as if Google were a private company. In other words, <strong>they raised funds from the capital market, but explicitly rejected to be subject to market for corporate control.</strong> Since Google’s successful IPO in 2004, several Silicon Valley IT companies, such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn, and Zynga, have adopted similar dual class structure when they went public. It is widely believed that these companies would have not done IPO unless the multiple voting shares were allowed.</blockquote><br/> И из другого документа про dual class structure<br/> <br/> Although DCS [dual-class-shares] structures are not new—having first came into existence in the late 19th century—such structures have become increasingly commonplace in recent times on the back of a wave of high-profile<strong>IPOs of technology companies</strong>, such as <strong>Google</strong> LLC (now Alphabet Inc., 2004), LinkedIn Corporation (2011), Facebook, Inc. (2012), Alibaba Group Holding Limited (2014), and Snap Inc. (2017).<br/> According to Ritter (2017), in the five years between 2006 and 2010, there were a total of 46 DCS IPOs in the United States.1 In the following five years (2011–2015), the number rose to 104. The popularity of DCS IPOs has renewed the debate on how these structures affect corporate governance and investor protection.<br/> Proponents like DCS because they protect the founding shareholders and<br/> beneficiaries of super voting rights from the vagaries of the stock market. Their voting power ensures them absolute control, giving them the opportunity to carry out their vision and invest in the long term for the benefit of all shareholders.<br/> Another argument for supporting DCS is that many entrepreneurs would simply<br/> choose not to take their companies public if they could not retain control; this would deprive investors of opportunities to invest in growth companies"